Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.     

Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994).     

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.     

CONSUMPTION GROWTH ACCOUNTING

The methodology in this paper combines an input–output structural decomposition approach with the supply-side perspective of mainstream growth accounting. In explaining the intertemporal change in consumption per worker, three sets of effects are distinguished. First, contributions due to several types of technological changes are considered. Second, effects caused by changes in international trade are discerned. Third, composition effects that reflect structural shifts in demand (including changes in tastes) are quantified. As an empirical illustration, we analyze the developments in the U.K. between 1979 and 1990.     

Bioenergy Crop Production in the United States: Potential Quantities, Land Use Changes, and Economic Impacts on the Agricultural Sector

The U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Energyjointly analyzed the economic potential for,and impacts of, large-scale bioenergy cropproduction in the United States. Anagricultural sector model (POLYSYS) wasmodified to include three potential bioenergycrops (switchgrass, hybrid poplar, and willow). At farmgate prices of US $2.44/GJ, anestimated 17 million hectares of bioenergycrops, annually yielding 171 million dry Mg ofbiomass, could potentially be produced at aprofit greater than existing agricultural usesfor the land. The estimate assumes highproductivity management practices are permittedon Conservation Reserve Program lands. Traditional crops prices are estimated toincrease 9 to 14 percent above baseline pricesand farm income increases annually by US $6.0billion above baseline.At farmgate prices of US $1.83/GJ, anestimated 7.9 million hectares of bioenergycrops, annually yielding 55 million dry Mg ofbiomass, could potentially be produced at aprofit greater than existing agricultural usesfor the land. The estimate assumes managementpractices intended to achieve highenvironmental benefits on Conservation ReserveProgram lands. Traditional crops prices areestimated to increase 4 to 9 percent abovebaseline prices and farm income increasesannually by US $2.8 billion above baseline.     

Joseph A. Schumpeter’s contributions in the area of fiscal sociology: a first approximation

Fiscal sociology deals with the ramifications of the fiscal activities of the state into areas which are not their primary target. These effects may occur in sectors not directly affected such as related markets, but they may also occur outside the economic sphere proper, such as in politics, culture, religion, or society at large. Schumpeter contributed to the research project of fiscal sociology throughout his life. In this first approximation, his contribution is discussed in terms of his appreciation of three important scholars who all made landmark contributions to fiscal sociology: Franz Oppenheimer, Werner Sombart, and Gustav (von) Schmoller.JEL Classification: B15, H39